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Abstract
In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm’s productive
asset, embedding the relevant decision makers into a general structure of formal au-
thority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a
principal to some decision makers, while she acts as an agent in relation to certain
other decision makers. We study under which conditions decision makers decide to
exercise their own authority and to accept their superiors’ authority.
We distinguish two types of behavior within such an authority situation. First,
we investigate a non-cooperative equilibrium concept describing the explicit, myopic
exercise of authority. We find that if monitoring costs are sufficiently small, such
explicit authority is exercised fully.
Second, we consider the possibility of subordinates to submit themselves to au-
thority even though such authority is not enforced explicitly. Again for sufficiently
small monitoring costs such latent authority can be supported as an equilibrium.
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1 Introduction: Exercising authority
In this paper we develop an alternative approach to modelling the use and enforcement of
formal authority within a given hierarchical production organization. We do not intend to
develop an alternative theory on the nature of the firm, but rather limit our investigations
to the nature of authority in a given formal authority structure that regulates the access of
agents to a productive asset.
In contemporary literature on the firm, the nature of authority in (hierarchical) produc-
tion organizations is a major field of investigation. Since the seminal contributions of Coase
[10], Simon [39], Williamson [41, 42], Grossman and Hart [16], and Hart and Moore [18]
the literature has mainly developed towards a theory of incomplete contracting which tries
to explain the formation of firms from the ownership over residual rights, i.e., rights that
are not contractible.1 One of the main limitations of this theory is that it mostly studies
situations with a rather limited number of authority relationships. Another problem with
this approach is the focus on ownership. As Rajan and Zingales [32] put it: “The property
rights view does not consider employees’ part of the firm because, given that employees
cannot be owned, there is no sense in which they are any different from agents who contract
with the firm at arm’s length”.
Following Rajan and Zingales [32] we place the control of access to a productive asset
at the center of our investigations and, thus, of our model of enforcing formal authority
within a production organization. We pursue an alternative approach, explicitly allowing
arbitrarily complex structures of formal authority relations using deterministic concepts
from noncooperative as well as cooperative game theory and the theory of social situations
(Greenberg [15]). We explicitly assume a given environment consisting of a fixed set of
agents2, a productive asset, and a structure of formal authority relationships between these
agents regulating the control of the access to the productive asset. We view such a for-
mal authority relationship as between a “superior” and a “subordinate”. The superior is
assumed to have the power to control the access of the subordinate to the productive asset.
Our formal theory is now based on three primitives:
(1) a description of the productive values that can be generated by the different teams of
agents that are generated through accessing the productive asset,
(2) a structure of formal authority relationships which represents the distribution of the
power to regulate the access of individual agents to the productive asset, and
1For recent developments regarding the theory of incomplete contracting and its foundations we refer to
Maskin and Tirole [27] and Hart and Moore [19].
2Throughout this paper we use the term “agent” synonymously with the standard notion of an “economic
actor”. Hence, unless stated explicitly, an agent does not refer to an agent as in a principal-agent relationship.
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(3) a utility structure describing the preferences of the agents over the different produc-
tion situations.
We give a short description of each of these primitives.
First, following the seminal work of Alchian and Demsetz [2], we assume that pro-
duction is in principle a collective effort. Teams of agents access the productive asset and
generate a collective production value.3 Formally, the potential collective output values of
the different teams are represented by a cooperative game with transferable utility. This
is also the modelling principle of the literature quoted. We assume that these productive
capacities are completely independent of the regulation of a team’s access to the productive
asset of the firm. In that respect these output values only have a potential nature.
Second, we introduce an arbitrarily complex structure of formal authority relationships.
Our main hypothesis is that one has to distinguish “authority” itself from the deliberate en-
forcement of authority, or “enforced authority”. Following Aghion and Tirole [1] we define
formal authority of an individual as the formal contracted right of that individual to control
the access of certain other individual agents to the firm’s asset. Hence, within a formal
authority relation we distinguish one superior and one subordinate such that the superior
has the right to control the access to the productive asset by the subordinate. An agent is
usually a superior to one or more subordinates, but is herself possibly also a subordinate
to one or more superiors. In this regard individual agents within an authority structure are
“relative principals” as well as “relative agents” in the sense of a regular principal-agent
relation.
This implies that a team has to obtain some form of permission from the superiors of
the members of the team before it has access to the firm’s productive asset. We assume
that such permission is only required if formal authority relationships are “enforced” by
the various superiors of members of the team. If authority is not enforced, in principle such
authority has not to be granted.
Here, we define authority to be enforced when costs are incurred to monitor certain
subordinates with the aim to actually regulate or control their access to the firm’s asset.
When an individual agent — as a relative principal or superior within the formal authority
structure — decides to enforce her formal authority over some of her subordinates, she
engages in monitoring to detect whether a subordinate pursues unauthorized access to the
firm’s asset. This implies that in principle enforcing authority is costly. If a subordinate
does not assume the objectives of the superior, the superior can ultimately sanction that
3To support the hypothesis that team production is collective, we quote Alchian and Demsetz [2], page
779: “With team production it is difficult, solely by observing total output, to either define or determine each
individual’s contribution to this output of the cooperating units.” For a more elaborate discussion we also
refer to Hart and Moore [18] and Ichiishi [21].
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subordinate by firing him, i.e., the superior can deny that subordinate access to the firm’s
productive asset.
Throughout this paper we assume that the incurred costs of monitoring are uniform.
Furthermore, we do not complicate the model by assuming that monitoring is imperfect,
i.e., we assume that monitoring is perfect. This allows us to handle the enforcement of
authority in a completely deterministic fashion and to analyze situations with an arbitrarily
complex authority structure. Extension to imperfect monitoring are left for future research,
which requires the application of game theoretic models of incomplete and imperfect in-
formation.
Third, we introduce a utility structure describing the motivations of the agents within
the firm. Our main hypothesis is that the individual utilities are completely determined by
the output values that are realized by the various teams of agents within the firm. Each
individual agent is assumed to participate voluntarily in these value-generating teams and
shares in these values. Now each individual agent assesses her position in such a situation
only on the realized output values of the various teams. Hence, we assume that the authority
structure itself has no direct externalities. It only has indirect consequences on the utility
levels generated through the enforcement of authority and the denial of certain agents to
access the firm’s asset.
Above we introduced the notions of formal and enforced authority. At the heart of our
study is the game theoretic analysis of the strategic decision making processes whether to
enforce the assigned formal authority or not. We recall that the concept of formal authority
is represented by the given structure of formal authority relations between the agents. For
each formal authority relationship it can now be decided whether it should be enforced
or not. In our framework the strategic enforcement of authority is developed into two
fundamentally different fashions: the explicit and latent enforcement of authority.
Explicit enforcement of authority is the willful or strategic decision to enforce the for-
mal authority to control the access of a subordinate to the firm’s productive asset. As
indicated, this is done by monitoring the subordinate, possibly incurring monitoring costs.
Our model of explicit authority is developed as a non-cooperative strategic or normal
form authority game. Each individual agent selects which subordinates to monitor within
the formal authority structure. This leads to a certain structure of enforced formal authority
relations. Monitoring costs are taken into account and determine together with the proper-
ties of the utility function of the individual whether enforcing formal authority is profitable
for an individual or not. The resulting Nash equilibria describe the resulting individually
stable structures of explicitly enforced (formal) authority relationships. Under mild condi-
tions we show that complete exercise of formal authority is warranted under low enough
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monitoring costs. This is as one would expect.
Latent authority is exercised if the (rational) subordinate voluntarily behaves as if his
access to the firm’s productive asset were monitored explicitly by his superior, even though
there is no actual monitoring taking place, and, thus, formal authority is not explicitly
enforced by his superior. Latent authority comes about in situations where rational sub-
ordinates take into account the abilities of a superior to exercise their formal authority
explicitly by engaging in monitoring. Obviously, under latent authority, social gains are
generated and, therefore, is socially preferable over explicit authority. The model of latent
authority can be considered to be a formal construction to explain the elusive concept of
“loyalty”.
The setup of our analysis is as follows. Within the formal structure of an authority situ-
ation consisting of the three concepts described above, we develop two models of enforcing
authority. The first model is founded on a very straightforward description of explicit mon-
itoring and leads to an understanding when the explicit enforcement of formal authority
takes place. The second model describes a more advanced standard of (boundedly) ratio-
nal behavior that results into latent authority. Our main results are valid under rather mild
conditions on the authority and utility structure.
The analysis of latent authority leads to some surprising insights. In case some formal
authority is not enforced explicitly, subordinates may act as if such authority is enacted
fully. This approach is based on the insight that superiors can induce states in which certain
subordinates are monitored. Sufficiently rational subordinates now correctly anticipate
under which conditions monitoring will be induced by their superiors. Given these correct
beliefs, all subordinates may voluntarily act as if they are fully monitored even though
that might not be the case. We show that if monitoring costs are sufficiently low, in the
equilibrium state subordinates will voluntarily submit to full authority, i.e., a state of full
latent authority emerges. Hence, this approach provides an alternative foundation for the
phenomenon that formal authority need not be exercised explicitly in order to be effective,
confirming the main insight from standard principal-agent theory which is based on the
analysis of much simpler authority situations.
These main insights for these two fundamentally different models of “real” authority
— in the sense of Aghion and Tirole [1] — are established under a single condition on
the utility structure denoted as dual monotonicity. This is a relatively mild condition on
the utility structure that is satisfied by most known solution concepts in cooperative game
theory. We provide a comparison of this condition to the well known monotonicity require-
ments from the literature on cooperative games with transferable utility in Appendix B of
this paper.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the constituting elements of our
theory. In the third section we introduce our analysis of the explicit exercise of authority
through the concept of a normal form authority game. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis
of the latent exercise of authority. In Section 5 we give a comparison of both models.
Section 6 discusses some concluding remarks as well as the relationship of this approach
to the existing literature on authority or power in hierarchical organizations. Throughout
this paper the proofs of the main results are relegated to Appendix A.
2 Foundations of the theory
In this section we introduce the three primitives of our theory, discussed in the introduction.
These three primitive elements are collected into a so-called authority situation, which
gives a complete description of the agents’ output values, the formal authority relations
between the participating agents, as well as their preferences.
Our formal theory is founded on the theory of cooperative games with an authority
structure developed in Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink [14], Derks and Gilles [11], Gilles
and Owen [13], van den Brink [7], and van den Brink and Gilles [8]. In this theory a
standard cooperative game with transferable utility is extended to incorporate hierarchical
authority relationships between the agents. Here we limit ourselves to the formal theory of
the so-called conjunctive approach introduced by Gilles, Owen and van den Brink [14].
Throughout the paper we let N = {1, . . . ,n} be a given finite set of agents, who engage
in productive activities and are collectively endowed with some given, formal hierarchical
authority structure.
2.1 Team production
First we introduce a description of the productive capabilities of teams of agents in the
given set N seeking access to the firm’s asset. We base ourselves on the theory of Alchian
and Demsetz [2] on team production. As usual, we use the concept of a cooperative game
with transferable utility on N to describe the potential output values that the various teams
can generate by accessing the firm’s productive asset. The hypothesis that these potential
output values can be represented through a cooperative game is also one of the principles
underlying Hart and Moore [18] and Ichiishi [21].
Formally, a cooperative game with transferable utility — or simply a game — on N is
a function v : 2N → R such that v(∅) = 0. A game assigns to every team of agents E ⊂ N
some potential output value v(E)∈R that can be attained collectively by that team through
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accessing the firm’s productive asset. The collection of all games on agent set N is denoted
by G N .
A game v ∈ G N is monotone if for all E ⊂ F ⊂ N we have v(E)6 v(F). Note that this
implies that v(E)> 0 for all E ⊂ N. A game v ∈ G N is strictly monotone if v is monotone
and for all E ⊂ F ⊂ N with E 6= F we have v(E)< v(F).
Since we consider these games to be descriptions of potential output values rather than
realized output values, it is natural to suppose that the agents have preferences over which
production situation they participate in. We assume that these preferences are completely
based on the (potential) output values that the various teams can attain, and do not depend
on the authority relationships between the agents.
Formally, each agent i∈N is assumed to be endowed with a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function ui : G N →R over all possible games. Now the composite function u : G N →
RN defines a utility structure over G N . A utility structure describes the desires of the agents
in N. In the literature certain utility structures have a prominent place. (We refer to the
seminal work of Herstein and Milnor [20].) Roth [34, 36] has shown that the adoption of
certain risk-neutrality assumptions leads to the Shapley value (Shapley [37]) as the only
feasible vNM utility structure4. Here the Shapley value ϕS : G N →RN is defined for every
agent i ∈ N and every game v ∈ G N by
ϕSi (v)≡ ∑
{E⊂N | i∈E }
(|E|−1)! (n−|E|)!
n!
(v(E)− v(E \{i})) (1)
In case of simple games, Roth [35] shows that the utility structure defined by this type of
conditions includes the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf [5]).5 The following properties of utility
structures are important in our analysis.
Definition 2.1 The utility structure u : G N → RN on G N satisfies
(i) additivity if for all v,w∈G N it holds that u(v+w)= u(v)+u(w), where (v+w)(E)=
v(E)+w(E) for every E ⊂ N.
(ii) the null player property if for every v ∈ G N and i ∈ N with v(E ∪{i}) = v(E) for
every E ⊂ N, it holds that ui (v) = 0.
(iii) dual monotonicity if for every v,w ∈ G N such that there is an F ⊂ N for which
v(F)6 w(F), and v(E) = w(E) for all E ∈ 2N \{F}, it holds that ui(v)> ui(w) for
all i ∈ N \F.
4In the related literature on incomplete contracts the Shapley value has also been used in e.g., Hart and
Moore [18]. An implementation of the Shapley value is given by, e.g., Pe´rez-Castillo and Wettstein [29].
5We refer to van den Brink and van der Laan [9] for a complete discussion of the properties of the
normalized Banzhaf value.
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(iv) strong dual monotonicity if for every v,w∈ G N such that there is an F ⊂N for which
v(F)< w(F), and v(E) = w(E) for all E ∈ 2N \{F}, it holds that ui(v)> ui(w) for
all i ∈ N \F.
We remark that both the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value satisfy all properties given in
Definition 2.1. Additivity and the null player property are familiar concepts in cooperative
game theory. Dual monotonicity and strong dual monotonicity impose that agents are
envious of potential payoffs to teams of which they are not a member. We study these two
properties more exhaustively in Appendix B. We restate strong dual monotonicity in a form
that we use throughout this paper.
Lemma 2.2 A utility structure u : G N → RN satisfies strong dual monotonicity if and only
if for all v,w ∈ G N and i ∈ N such that
(i) there is a team F ⊂ N \{i} for which v(F)< w(F),
(ii) v(E)6 w(E) for all E ⊂ N \{i}, and
(iii) v(E) = w(E) for all E ⊂ N with i ∈ E,
it holds that ui(v)> ui(w).
Proof. The “only if” part is straightforward. The “if” part follows from repeated applica-
tion of the definition of strong dual monotonicity given in Definition 2.1. ¤
2.2 Authority structures
Next we consider the description of formal authority relations between the participants
in the production organization. An authority structure on N is a map S : N → 2N that
assigns to every agent i ∈ N a set S(i)⊂ N of direct subordinates. The class of all authority
structures on N is denoted byS N .
Here we interpret an authority structure S ∈S N as that an agent j ∈ S (i) has to obtain
“permission” from agent i for any productive activity that he intends to undertake by him-
self or with other agents in a team, through accessing the firm’s productive asset. Therefore,
the set S−1(i) = { j ∈ N | i ∈ S( j)} consists of all direct superiors of i.
There are several interpretations of what the concept of “permission” might entail. We
limit ourselves to the conjunctive approach, developed in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink
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[14], van den Brink and Gilles [8], and Derks and Gilles [11], in which the induced au-
thority structure establishes complete control of the superior over her direct subordinates.6
Below we develop a description of this interpretation.
First we introduce some auxiliary concepts.
Let S ∈S N and E ⊂ N. We define S (E) = ∪i∈ES (i) as the set of direct subordinates
of the agents in the team E. Similarly, we define S−1 (E) = {i ∈ N | S (i)∩E 6=∅} as the
set of direct superiors of the agents in E.
The transitive closure of S∈S N is the mapping Ŝ: N → 2N which for every agent i∈N
is defined by j ∈ Ŝ (i) if and only if there is a finite sequence h1, . . . ,hk ∈ N with h1 = i,
hk = j, and ht+1 ∈ S (ht) for all 16 t 6 k−1. The agents in Ŝ (i) are called the (direct and
indirect) subordinates of i in S. Similarly, the agents in Ŝ−1(i) := { j ∈ N | i ∈ Ŝ( j)} are
called the (direct and indirect) superiors of i in authority structure S.
Finally, we define BS = {i ∈ N | S−1(i) = ∅} and WS = {i ∈ N | S(i) = ∅}. Here, BS
is the set of position in S that are undominated. They can be interpreted as the “executive
officers” within the authority structure S. Similarly, the set WS consists of all powerless po-
sitions in the authority structure S. These positions can be interpreted as “non-management
positions”, and the agents occupying these positions can simply be indicated as “workers”.
Two basic properties of authority structures are used throughout this paper:
Definition 2.3 An authority structure S ∈S N is called
(i) acyclic if i /∈ Ŝ (i) for every agent i ∈ N, and
(ii) transparent if for every i ∈ N it holds that S (i)∩ Ŝ (S (i)) =∅.
Acyclicity requires that there are no formal authority cycles, which is a rather mild require-
ment. Essentially it implies that the organization structure is “top-down”.
The transparency condition implies that within the authority structure an agent is never
a direct superior of one of the subordinates of her subordinates, i.e., indirect authority
relations never coincide with direct authority relations. This condition therefore imposes
that the organization is “lean” and is not burdened with unnecessary authority relations.
We emphasize that neither acyclicity nor transparency imply that the authority structure
is hierarchical in the sense that there is a unique position at the top of the structure, i.e., the
property that |BS| = 1. Hence, throughout this paper we work with very general authority
structures, possibly with multiple “executive officers”.7
6Alternatively, in the disjunctive approach, developed in Gilles and Owen [13] and van den Brink [7],
the imposed authority structure consists of partial control in the sense that only the collective of all direct
superiors can veto an action of a direct subordinate.
7Usually, one might have even in mind an authority structure that is strictly hierarchical in the sense that
it is acyclic as well as hierarchical. We use such structures to illustrate properties in some of our examples.
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2.3 Authority situations
Next we combine the three primitive elements introduced previously. These are the pro-
ductive abilities — described by a game v ∈ G N — with a formal authority structure —
described by some S ∈S N . Furthermore, all agents are endowed with an objective, de-
scribed by the utility structure u on G N . The combination of these elements is denoted as
an authority situation. Formally, a pair (v,S)∈ G N×S N is called a game with an authority
structure on N. A triple (u,v,S) with u : G N →RN a utility structure and (v,S) a game with
an authority structure, is called an authority situation on N. We emphasize that the three
primitive elements making up an authority structure are assumed to be independent from
each other.
Definition 2.4 Let (v,S) be a game with an authority structure. An agent i ∈ N is inessen-
tial in (v,S) if i∈WS and v(E ∪{i}) = v(E) for every E ⊂N. Furthermore, an agent i∈N
is inessential in an authority situation (u,v,S) if i is inessential in (v,S).
An inessential agent is a null player in the game v as well as an irrelevant member of the
authority structure S in the sense that he has no authority over any other agents.
Next we address how an authority situation can be evaluated. As mentioned we assume
throughout that each superior is in principle able to exercise full authority over her subor-
dinates within (v,S). If such full authority is exercised, a team E ⊂ N cannot form without
the appropriate authority from all its superiors Ŝ−1 (E). Formally, a team E ⊂ N is au-
tonomous in S if Ŝ−1 (E)⊂ E. We denote by ΦS the collection of all autonomous teams in
the authority structure S.
If the team E is not autonomous, it cannot freely access the firm’s productive asset and
attain its potential productive output value. However, we can identify the largest sub-team
that can freely access the firm’s asset. Formally, E’s autonomous part in S is given by
σS (E) = E \ Ŝ (N \E). So, E is autonomous if and only if σS (E) = E.
Definition 2.5 Let (v,S) ∈ G N ×S N be a game with an authority structure on N. Its
restrictionR (v,S) ∈ G N is defined byR (v,S)(E) = v(σS (E)) for every E ⊂ N.
The induced mappingR(·,S) : G N →G N is linear and incorporates the effects of exercising
authority over the positions of the agents in the authority relationships S.8 We illustrate the
introduced concepts with an example.
8Some of the properties of this mapping are investigated in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink [14]. We
remark that similar approaches have been developed to analyze other restrictions on team formation. In
particular we refer to the seminal contribution by Aumann and Dre`ze [3] for situations with coalitional
partitions and to the seminal work of Myerson [28] for restrictions induced by communication networks.
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Figure 1: The permission structures with Example 2.6.
Example 2.6 We discuss a situation with four agents, N = {1,2,3,4}, and consider two
games with an authority structure (v,S1) and (v,S2). The authority structures S1 and S2 are
given by S1(1) = {2,3,4}, S1(2) = S1(4) = ∅, S1(3) = {4}, and S2(1) = {3}, S2(2) =
S2(4) = ∅, S2(3) = {4}. These authority structures are depicted in Figure 1. We let the
cooperative game v be given by v(E) = 3 if 4 ∈ T and v(E) = 0 otherwise.
We remark that authority structure S1 is not transparent since S1 (1)∩ Ŝ1 (S1 (1))= {4} 6=∅.
Hence, agent 1 dominates agent 4 directly, although 1 also dominates 4 indirectly through
3. On the other hand, authority structure S2 is transparent. Furthermore,
R (v,S1)(E) =R (v,S2)(E) =
{
3 if {1,3,4} ⊂ E
0 otherwise.
Hence, the restriction of v on both authority structures is the same. This is due to the fact
that there are superfluous relationships in non-transparent hierarchies. Deleting these re-
lationships does not affect the restriction of a game. This is the case for the relationship
between agents 1 and 4 in S1.
Furthermore, Agent 2 is an inessential agent in (v,S1). Removing relationships with inessen-
tial agents does not affect the restriction either. (We also refer to van den Brink and Gilles
[8] for more elaborate discussions.) ¤
Next we address the question whether the restriction R is an appropriate description of
the explicit enforcement of authority. The next theorem gives a normative justification
for its use. We identify the restriction R as the unique mapping F : G N ×S N → G N
satisfying four regularity assumptions and one descriptive hypothesis. This descriptive
property, stated as 2.7(v), states that an agent i∈N \WS “vetoes” her direct subordinates j ∈
S (i) in the sense that the contribution of agent j to a team is non-trivial only if agent i herself
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is a member of that team. This exactly describes that a superior can deny a subordinate
access to the firm’s productive asset.
Theorem 2.7 A mapping F : G N ×S N → G N is equal to the restriction R if and only if
the mappingF satisfies the following properties:
(i) For every (v,S) ∈ G N ×S N it holds thatF (v,S)(N) = v(N);
(ii) For every (v,S),(w,S)∈ G N×S N it holds thatF (v+w,S) =F (v,S)+ F (w,S);
(iii) For every (v,S) ∈ G N ×S N and i ∈ N such that all j ∈ Ŝ(i)∪{i} are null players
in v it holds that i is a null player inF (v,S);
(iv) For every (v,S) ∈ G N ×S N and i ∈ N such that v(E) = 0 for all E ⊂ N \ {i} it
holds thatF (v,S)(E) = 0 for all E ⊂ N \{i};
(v) For every (v,S)∈G N×S N , i∈N, j∈ S(i), and E ⊂N\{i} it holds thatF (v,S)(E)=
F (v,S)(E \{ j}).
The proof of this theorem can be found with all other proofs in Appendix A. Without
proof we mention that the five properties in Theorem 2.7 are independent, and thus this
axiomatization is proper.
The remainder of this paper discusses two game theoretic approaches to the exercise of
authority in hierarchical organizations using the restriction R. In these approaches the
individual agents decide whether to exercise authority over their subordinates based on the
preferences of these agents as represented by the utility structure u.
Throughout this paper we consider a given authority situation (u,v,S) in which there
are no inessential agents. We make this assumption solely for notational convenience.
Without exception, our results can be restated to include inessential agents. We consider
which of the formal authority relations in S agent i ∈ N \WS chooses to enforce. Thus,
each agent i ∈ N \WS selects a subset T (i) ⊂ S (i) of formal authority relations that she
decides to enforce. If each potential superior has selected such a set of explicitly enforced
authority relations we arrive at an authority structure consisting of exactly all explicitly
enforced authority relations. The resulting authority structure is an element in the following
collection of authority structures:
H(S) :=
{
T ∈S N |T (i)⊂ S (i) for every agent i ∈ N
}
. (2)
An authority structure T ∈H(S) thus describes those authority relations that are enforced.
In comparison, the relations described by S−T ∈ H(S), where for every i ∈ N we define
(S−T )(i) = S (i)\T (i), only have a latent or non-enforced quality.
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Our next result states that under certain regularity conditions, agents indeed prefer to
exercise as much authority as possible if it is costless to do so.
Theorem 2.8 Assume that v is a monotone game. Let h ∈ N \WS and T ∈ H(S) be such
that T (h) 6= S(h). Finally, let Z ∈H(S) be given by
Z(i) =
{
S(h) if i = h
T (i) otherwise.
Then:
(a) If utility structure u satisfies dual monotonicity, then uh (R (v,Z))> uh (R (v,T )).
(b) If utility structure u satisfies strong dual monotonicity andR (v,Z) 6=R (v,T ), then
uh (R (v,Z))> uh (R (v,T )).
(c) Suppose that v is strictly monotone, S is acyclic, and u satisfies strong dual mono-
tonicity. If T (h) =∅ or S is transparent, then uh (R (v,Z))> uh (R (v,T )).
The proof of Theorem 2.8 is relegated to Appendix A. Theorem 2.8 forms the foundation
for further analysis of the enforcement of authority within a hierarchical organization.
3 Exercising explicit authority
In this section we analyze the decision-making processes of myopically rational agents
who decide which of their formal authority relations to enforce explicitly. We model this
by means of a non-cooperative normal form game.
Every agent i ∈ N \WS has strategy set given by Γi = {E ⊂ N |E ⊂ S (i)}. (Clearly,
for every worker j ∈ WS it holds that Γ j := {∅}.) A strategy Ei ∈ Γi describes those
subordinates over which agent i explicitly enforces her authority. Let E = (E1, . . . ,En) ∈
Γ := ∏i∈N Γi be a strategy tuple. Then the resulting authority structure is the one given by
TE ∈H(S) with TE (i) := Ei for all agents i ∈ N.
Since the explicit exercise of authority usually induces a cost to monitor these subordi-
nates, we introduce a fixed monitoring cost parameter c > 0. We impose that monitoring
any subordinate j ∈ S(i) by an agent i ∈ N \WS will cost c> 0. This leads to the following
formalization:
Definition 3.1 The authority game induced by (u,v,S) and monitoring cost parameter
c > 0 is defined by the tuple Θc = (N,{Γi,uci }i∈N) with for every strategy tuple E =
(E1, . . . ,En) ∈ Γ
uci (E ) = ui (R (v,TE ))− c |Ei| . (3)
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For the authority game Θc with monitoring cost c> 0 we consider the standard equilibrium
concepts. A strategy tuple Ê =
(
Ê1, . . . , Ên
)
∈ Γ is a Nash equilibrium in Θc if for every
i ∈ N and every Ei ∈ Γi we have that uci
(
Ê
)
> uci
(
Ê−i,Ei
)
, where
(
Ê−i,Ei
)
∈ Γ is a
modification of the strategy tuple Ê in which agent i selects Ei and each agent j 6= i selects
Ê j. We denote byN (Θc)⊂ Γ the set of all Nash equilibria of the authority game Θc.
A Nash equilibrium Ê ∈N (Θc) is called strict if for every i ∈ N and every Ei ∈ Γi
with Ei 6= Êi it holds that uci
(
Ê
)
> uci
(
Ê−i,Ei
)
. The set of strict Nash equilibria of Θc is
denoted byNs (Θc)⊂N (Θc).
For ease of notation we denote for every authority structure T ∈H(S) the corresponding
strategy tuple by E T =
(
ET1 , . . . ,E
T
n
)
, where ETi := T (i) for every i ∈ N. Now the strategy
tuple E S refers to the complete exercise of authority within the given structure S.
Definition 3.2 An authority structure T ∈H(S) is (v,S)-equivalent if R (v,T ) =R (v,S).
We denote byM(v,S) the collection of (v,S)-equivalent authority structures.
An authority structure T ∈H(S) is (v,S)-minimal if T is (v,S)-equivalent and
|T |= min
{∣∣T ′∣∣ ∣∣T ′ ∈M(v,S)} (4)
where |T ′| = ∑i∈N |T ′ (i)| is the total number of authority relationships in the authority
structure T ′ ∈H(S). We denote by M̂(v,S) the set of (v,S)-minimal authority structures.
We remark that S ∈M(v,S) and therefore M̂(v,S) 6= ∅ for any game with an authority
structure. Using these auxiliary concepts we are able to give a partial characterization of
the (strict) Nash equilibria of the authority game with costless monitoring and dual mono-
tone utility structures. Nash equilibria under costless monitoring exist for dual monotone
utility structures, while for strong dual monotonicity even complete characterizations can
be given. The proofs of the following two theorems are again relegated to Appendix A.
Theorem 3.3 Let (u,v,S) be an authority situation such that u is a dual monotone utility
structure and v is a monotone game. Then:
(a) {E T |T ∈M(v,S)}⊂N (Θ0), and
(b) Ns
(
Θ0
)
⊂
{
E S
}
.
Next we address the (strict) Nash equilibria under costless monitoring and strong dual
monotonicity.
Theorem 3.4 Let (u,v,S) be such that u is a strongly dual monotone utility structure and
v is a monotone game.
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(a) If S ∈ M̂(v,S), thenNs
(
Θ0
)
=N
(
Θ0
)
=
{
E S
}
.
(b) If S /∈ M̂(v,S), thenNs
(
Θ0
)
=∅ andN
(
Θ0
)
=
{
E T |T ∈M(v,S)
}
.
We remark that the assertions of Theorem 3.4 are no longer valid if the utility structure is
merely dual monotone instead of strongly dual monotone. This can be illustrated by the
egalitarian utility structure u¯ given by u¯i (v) = v(N)|N| , i ∈ N, based on the equal division of
the total output value of the grand coalition N. The egalitarian utility structure u¯ is dual
monotone, but not strongly dual monotone. For any (v,T ), T ∈H(S), u¯(R (v,T )) = u¯(v),
i.e., the utilities received are equal regardless the authority structure implemented. This
implies thatN
(
Θ0
)
=
{
E T |T ∈H(S)
}
.
For sufficiently low monitoring costs we derive the following insight. A proof of The-
orem 3.5 is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 3.5 Let (u,v,S) be such that u is a strongly dual monotone utility structure and
v is a monotone game. Then there exists a cost level c∗ > 0 such that for every 0 < c < c∗
it holds that
N (Θc) =
{
E
T
∣∣∣T ∈ M̂(v,S)} .
It is evident that every minimal authority structure is transparent, i.e., there are no super-
fluous authority relationships in such structures. This immediately leads to the following
corollary of Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 3.6 If the utility structure is strongly dual monotone, the potential productive
output values are monotone, and the monitoring costs are sufficiently low, then the resulting
Nash equilibrium authority structures are transparent.
We illustrate this analysis by referring to Example 2.6. Let the game v and the authority
structures S1 and S2 be as given. Then for any authority situation (u,v,S1) with the utility
structure u strongly dual monotone, the unique resulting Nash equilibrium authority struc-
ture for sufficiently low monitoring costs is S2. (In fact, S2 is the unique (v,S1)-minimal
authority structure.) Clearly in S2 neither the redundant authority relationship 14 nor the
ineffective authority relationship 12 are enforced.
4 Exercising latent authority
In the previous section we discussed the explicit exercise of authority. Next we consider
a more advanced form of reasoning on part of the agents in the authority situation. Under
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this type of advanced rationality there might result situations in which superiors abstain
from the explicit exercise of authority, but in which their authority remains effective. Here,
even though authority is not exercised explicitly, subordinates might nevertheless perceive
a potential, or latent, threat that a superior is willing to exercise that authority explicitly and
incur monitoring costs if they do not voluntarily restrict their productive activities. Thus,
these subordinates might act as if authority was exercised explicitly. If such behavior
results, we talk about latent authority to distinguish it from explicit authority.
It is clear that such latent authority cannot be described properly by the game theoretic
structure introduced in the previous section. In those authority games the only way for
an agent to profit from her formal authority is to explicitly enforce it. In this section we
present an approach in which agents can choose to enforce authority explicitly as well
as not to enforce any authority at all. This allows us to define an equilibrium concept that
incorporates that the subordinates perceive threats that their superiors will enforce authority
relationships with them. Thus, the resulting equilibria describe outcomes that are based on
implicit considerations rather than explicit considerations. This approach is based on the
theory of social situations developed in Greenberg [15].
For every authority structure T ∈ H(S) we define the set of potential authorizers in T
by
ψ (T ) = {i ∈ N |T (i) =∅ and S (i) 6=∅}
Here, the agents in ψ (T ) ⊂ N \WS are the ones who are undecided regarding the explicit
enforce of their authority. From this it might be clear that the set of explicit authorizers
in T can be introduced as ψ ′ (T ) = N \ (ψ (T )∪WS). Note that for S0 ∈ H(S) given by
S0 (i) =∅ for every i ∈ N, it holds that ψ (S0) = N \WS and ψ ′ (S0) =∅.
To describe the ability of a superior i ∈ N \WS to enforce authority, we introduce an
auxiliary tool. Namely, as long as agent i does not enforce any authority, she still has the
ability to execute her authority over any subset of her direct subordinates. Hence, agent
i can induce from any authority structure in which she does not enforce any authority,
another authority structure in which she (partially) enforces the formal authority that is
assigned to her within S.
The point-to-set mapping γi :H(S)→ 2H(S) is the veto correspondence for agent i ∈ N
on S ∈S N if
γi (T ) =
{ {
T Fi |∅ 6= F ⊂ S (i)
}
if i ∈ ψ (T )
∅ if i /∈ ψ (T )
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where for every F ⊂ S (i) we define T Fi ∈H(S) by
T Fi ( j) =
{
T ( j) if j 6= i
F if j = i.
The multidimensional mapping γ := (γ1, . . . ,γn) :H(S)→ 2H(S)×N is called the veto struc-
ture on S.
Let γ = (γ1, . . . ,γn) be a veto structure on S. It is obvious that γ defines a configura-
tion that describes the exact enforce of authority within the boundaries of a given authority
structure. Remark that each agent in N \WS can announce only once over which subordi-
nates she is exercising explicit authority. Within the veto structure γ we are now able to
construct equilibria that describe the stable states of the latent exercise of authority. We
define for every T ∈H(S)
Λ(v,T ) = {R (v,Z) |T (i)⊂ Z(i)⊂ S(i) for all i ∈ N }
as the set of all games that can potentially result from T within (v,S).
Definition 4.1 Let (u,v,S) be some authority situation on N.
(i) A point-to-set mapping Σ : H(S)→ 2G N is an authority protocol for (u,v,S) if for
every T ∈H(S) it holds that Σ(T )⊂ Λ(v,T ).
(ii) Let a monitoring cost c > 0 be given. An authority protocol Σc : H(S)→ 2G N
is stable for (u,v,S) if for every T ∈ H(S) it holds that w ∈ Σc(T ) if and only if
w ∈ Λ(v,T ) and there is no agent i ∈ ψ(T ), authority structure T ′ ∈ γi(T ) and
w′ ∈ Σc(T ′) with
ui(w
′)− c|T ′(i)|> ui(w)− c|T (i)|. (5)
An authority protocol assigns to every authority structure T within S a set of games that can
emerge within (u,v,T ) given the formal authority structure S. In this respect an authority
protocol is a potential solution for the latent exercise of authority within (u,v,S).
From the definition, a stable authority protocol is an equilibrium concept that describes
the latent exercise of authority within (u,v,S). Namely, it incorporates the individual in-
centives to explicitly veto subordinates. However, it formalizes the potential, or latent,
development of the exercise of authority, not how it is actualized. Hence, it exactly formal-
izes the notion of a perceived exercise of authority within (u,v,S). We remark that a stable
authority protocol satisfies the von Neumann–Morgenstern notions of internal and external
stability. For convenience we indicate a stable authority protocol by SAP.
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The next theorem addresses the existence of a stable authority protocol. It is shown
that there is a unique SAP for authority situations with a monotone game and an acyclic
authority structure. Moreover, if the utility structure u is strongly dual monotone, all direct
subordinates of agents that have not yet explicitly exercised their authority act as if they
were monitored by their superiors. In particular, if no agent has explicitly enforced her
authority to monitor and veto, every subordinate acts as if all agents fully enforce their
authority. Hence, in equilibrium full latent authority is enforced. For a proof we again
refer to Appendix A.
Theorem 4.2 Let (u,v,S) be an authority situation such that v ∈ G N is monotone and
S ∈S N is acyclic. Then:
(a) For every monitoring cost level c> 0 there exists a unique stable authority protocol
Σc∗ for (u,v,S).
(b) If the utility structure u is strongly dual monotone, then there exists a cost level
c∗ > 0 such that for every 0 6 c < c∗ and every T ∈ H(S) it holds that Σc∗(T ) =
{R (v,Z)} where Z ∈S N is given by
Z (i) =
{
T (i) if i /∈ ψ (T )
S (i) if i ∈ ψ (T ) .
In particular, Σc∗ (S0) = {R (v,S)} for 06 c < c∗, where S0 (i) =∅ for every i ∈ N.
5 The case of high monitoring costs
In this section we consider the consequences of higher monitoring costs for the explicit
and latent exercise of authority. We use a simple example to clarify some of these con-
sequences. A general analytical study is rather involved and therefore subject of future
research.
Throughout this section we consider a three agent situation with N = {1,2,3}. Further-
more, we impose the authority situation (ϕS,v,S), where (1) the utility structure ϕS : G N →
RN is equal to the Shapley value, (2) the formal authority structure S is given by S(1) =
S(2) = {3} and S(3) = ∅, and (3) the output values v is given by v(E) = 1 if 3 ∈ E and
v(E) = 0 otherwise. The authority structure S is depicted in Figure 2.
We develop the analysis of this authority situation in three steps: explicit exercise of
authority, latent exercise of authority, and a comparison between these two models of be-
havior.
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Figure 2: The authority structure S.
5.1 The explicit exercise of authority
The strategies of the two agents 1 and 2 in the authority game Θc are given by Γ1 = Γ2 =
{{3} ,∅}. Since agent 3 has no subordinates we treat the authority game as a two-person
game. For convenience we denote these two basic strategies as V = {3} (veto) and N =∅
(no veto).
Given positive monitoring cost c > 0 the payoffs for the four possible strategy pro-
files are u(V,V ) =
(1
3 − c,
1
3 − c,
1
3
)
, u(V,N) =
(1
2 − c,0,
1
2
)
, u(N,V ) =
(
0, 12 − c,
1
2
)
, and
u(N,N) = (0,0,1). The Nash equilibria for different values of c are now represented in the
following table:
Cost level Equilibria Utilities
c < 13 N (Θ
c) = {(V,V )} u =
(1
3 − c,
1
3 − c,
1
3
)
c = 13 N (Θ
c) = {(V,V ),(V,N),(N,V )} u ∈
{(
0,0, 13
)
,
(1
6 ,0,
1
2
)
,
(
0, 16 ,
1
2
)}
1
3 < c <
1
2 N (Θ
c) = {(V,N),(N,V )} u ∈
{(1
2 − c,0,
1
2
)
,
(
0, 12 − c,
1
2
)}
c = 12 N (Θ
c) = {(V,N),(N,V ),(N,N)} u ∈
{(
0,0, 12
)
,(0,0,1)
}
c > 12 N (Θ
c) = {(N,N)} u = (0,0,1)
So, if c < 13 or c >
1
2 there is a unique Nash equilibrium (both veto, respectively, not veto),
and for intermediate values there are multiple Nash equilibria.
5.2 The latent exercise of authority
Next we consider the latent exercise of authority and the corresponding notion of a stable
authority protocol. For convenience we denote by T1, T2, and S0 the authority structures
given by T1(1) = {3}, T1(2) = T1(3) = ∅ (only agent 1 enforces explicit authority over
agent 3), T2(1) = T2(3) = ∅, T2(2) = {3} (only agent 2 enforces explicit authority over
agent 3), and S0(1) = S0(2) = S0(3) = ∅ (neither 1 nor 2 enforce explicit authority over
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agent 3). For S, T1, T2, and S0 we have
Λ(v,S) = {R (v,S)}
Λ(v,T1) = {R (v,T1) ,R (v,S)}
Λ(v,T2) = {R (v,T2) ,R (v,S)}
Λ(v,S0) = {R (v,S0) ,R (v,T1) ,R (v,T2) ,R (v,S)}
For any cost c > 0 the unique SAP assigns to the full authority structure S its restriction
R (v,S) because nothing else can be induced from that situation. For the other situations
we distinguish three possibilities:
• c < 13 : Suppose that in situation T1 the game R (v,T1) with payoffs (
1
2 − c,0,
1
2) is
played. Since agent 2 can induce situation S with payoffs (13 − c,
1
3 − c,
1
3), the SAP
Σc∗ cannot assign R (v,T1) to this situation (agent 2’s payoff if he induces S is 13 − c
which exceeds it payoff 0 in situation T1). So, Σc∗(T1) = {R (v,S)} with payoffs
given by (13 − c,
1
3 ,
1
3) (Note that agent 2 does not actually has to pay its monitoring
cost if R (v,S) is played in situation T1). By a similar argument Σc∗(T2) = {R (v,S)}
with payoffs given by (13 ,
1
3 − c,
1
3).
Now, suppose that in situation S0 the game R (v,S0) with payoffs (0,0,1) is played.
Since agent 1 can induce T1 and the SAP assigns R (v,S) to situation T1 (with pay-
offs (13−c,
1
3 ,
1
3 )), the SAP cannot assign the gameR (v,S0) to situation S0 (agent 1’s
payoff if he induces T1 is 13 − c which exceeds it payoff 0 in situation S0). Suppose
that in situation S0 the game R (v,T1) with payoffs (12 ,0,
1
2) is played. Since agent
2 can induce T2 and the SAP assigns R (v,S) to T2 (with payoffs (13 , 13 − c, 13 )), the
SAP cannot assign the game R (v,T1) to situation S0. Similarly, R (v,T2) /∈ Σc∗(S0).
So, also in this situation Σc∗(S0) = {R (v,S)}. Thus according to the SAP, in situa-
tion S0 agents act as if both agents 1 and 2 enforce full authority over agent 3 with
corresponding payoff vector given by (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3).
• 13 < c<
1
2 : Suppose that in situation T1 the gameR (v,T1)with payoffs (
1
2−c,0,
1
2) is
played. Since agent 1 cannot induce any other situation and agent 2 can only induce
situation S (with payoffs (13 −c, 13 −c, 13)), the SAP assignsR (v,T1) to this situation.
Also, if in situation T1 the gameR (v,S) with payoffs (13 − c,
1
3 ,
1
3) is played, agent 2
cannot induce a situation in which it can do better. So, Σc∗(T1) = {R (v,T1) ,R (v,S)}.
(Note the difference with c < 13 considered above in which only R (v,S) was stable
in this situation.) By a similar argument Σc∗(T2) = {R (v,T2) ,R (v,S)}.
Now, suppose that in situation S0 the game R (v,S0) with payoffs (0,0,1) is played.
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Since agent 1 can induce T1 to which the SAP assigns R (v,T1) (with payoffs (12 −
c,0, 12)), the SAP cannot assign the game R (v,S0) to situation S0. Suppose that in
situation S0 the gameR (v,T1) with payoffs (12 −c,0,
1
2) is played. Since agent 2 can
induce T2 to which the SAP assigns R (v,T2) (with payoffs (0, 12 − c, 12)), the SAP
cannot assign the game R (v,T1) to situation S0. Similarly, R (v,T2) /∈ Σc∗(S0). No
agent can induce an advantageous situation ifR (v,S)with payoffs (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3) is played.
So, in this situation Σc∗(S0) = {R (v,S)}. Note that, although in the intermediate
situations T1 and T2 the latent exercise of authority is different for the cases c> 13 and
1
3 < c <
1
2 , for both cases in situation S0 agents act as if both agents 1 and 2 enforce
full authority over agent 3 with corresponding payoff vector given by (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3).
• c > 12 : In a similar way as above, it can be shown that Σ
c
∗(S) = {R (v,S)}, Σc∗(T1) =
{R (v,T1) ,R (v,S)} and Σc∗(T2) = {R (v,T2) ,R (v,S)}. Finally, it can be determined
that everything is stable in the situation in which all authority is latent, Σc∗(S0) =
{R (v,S0) ,R(v,T1),R (v,T2) ,R (v,S)}.
• For c = 13 and c =
1
2 intermediate cases apply.
5.3 A comparison
Comparing the Nash equilibria of the authority game and the stable authority protocol
describing the latent exercise of authority allow us to conclude that there is a difference
of the equilibrium utility levels when c < 12 . Namely, under explicit exercise of authority
the monitoring cost is actually realized, while this is not the case under the latent exercise
of authority. For 13 < c <
1
2 even the attitude towards exercising authority is different, as
described by these equilibrium concepts.
Namely, in the Nash equilibrium of the authority game authority is not enforced fully,
while under the SAP the agents act as if this authority is enforced fully if no agent has
announced whether it is going to enforce its authority. This significant difference indicates
that if agents are myopic — as modelled in the authority game —, there would be no full
exercise of authority in equilibrium. However, a more advanced form of rationality on part
of the subordinates — as modelled by the concept of a stable authority protocol —, would
induce them to accept full (latent) authority.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have developed a theory of the nature of authority within a given firm,
described as a hierarchical authority structure with team production. We introduced two
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models of the exercise of authority in a framework including a description of team pro-
duction, an arbitrarily complex authority structure of decision makers who are principal to
certain decision makers and agents to other decision makers, and a utility structure. The
first model addresses the explicit enforcement of authority through costly monitoring. The
second model describes a latent form of the exercise of authority, namely the rational ac-
ceptance of authority even though this authority is not enforced explicitly.
We emphasize that at the foundation of our theory, we consider the question of owner-
ship of the firm’s asset to have no bearing on the study of the nature of authority. Indeed,
we base our modelling on the hypothesis that ownership and control are fundamentally sep-
arated and that “control” is represented by the authority structure. Here decision makers in
the authority structure have delegated control over the firm’s asset in the sense that a deci-
sion maker can deny the access of her subordinates to the asset. This modelling principle
corresponds to observed practices; firms are either publicly traded or the owner exercises
his or her control through managers with delegated powers. In either case the question who
exactly owns the firm’s asset is of no consequence for the practices that result with regard
to the control of the firm’s asset. In our analysis there emerged two practices: directly or
explicitly exercised control and latently exercised control.
Finally, we emphasize that our model of the latent exercise of authority represents the
elusive concept of loyalty of subordinates to the firm and its objectives. Indeed, as mod-
elled, at a higher level of rationality, intelligent subordinates voluntarily submit themselves
to the objectives of their superiors to avoid being subjected to enforced monitoring. This
standard of behavior can in this respect be interpreted as a game theoretic formulation of
“loyalty”.
Relation to the literature
Our approach to the notion of authority is in line with the typology of authority relations
considered in Aghion and Tirole [1]. They distinguish formal from real authority within a
hierarchical production organization. Formal authority can be seen as the “right to decide”
while real authority is the “effective control over decisions.” In our theory the concept of
formal authority is represented by the given structure of formal authority relations between
agents. In our framework the notion of real authority is then further developed into two
distinct forms: explicit and latent.
Related is the distinction made in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy [4] between formal (“the
organizational chart”) and informal (“the way things really work”) aspects of organizational
structures. They study the interaction between asset ownership (which they consider to
be formal) and relational contracts (which they consider to be informal). The study of
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differences and interaction between formal and informal aspects of economic organizations
seems to be an important and growing topic for future research.
We emphasize that the formal authority structure of the hierarchical production orga-
nization in our model is exogenously given. Further research will be directed towards
endogenously determining the formal authority structure of the organization. In this paper
we restrict ourselves the question what game will be played within the organization given a
particular formal authority structure. And, thus, what real authority structures emerge en-
dogenously within the production organization. In this sense our model is complementary
to the literature that studies the endogenous formation of hierarchical authority structures
such as principal-agent models (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart [17] and Kessler [24]), mod-
els on vertical integration (see, e.g., Klein, Crawford and Alchian [25]), and models on
incomplete contracts (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart [16], and Hart and Moore [18, 19]).
As mentioned in the introduction, these models assume rather simple authority structures
while we allow for arbitrarily complex formal authority structures.
To study the formation of hierarchies, our model can be extended in various ways. One
extension is introducing risk as has been pursued by Prescott and Townsend [30] who study
how risk sharing can be a reason to form collective organizations. They study why these
collective organizations form by using principal-agent relations between these organiza-
tions and outsiders.
Beggs [6] uses techniques from queueing theory to determine the optimal structure of
hierarchies when workers differ in the range of tasks they can perform. He studies how
the complexity of tasks influences the organizational structure. He explains why many
organizations have a hierarchical structure by the economies of skilled workers. Skilled
workers can make decisions without consulting other workers, while unskilled workers
need to ask (superior) more skilled workers for advice or approval. In our model, the skills
of different workers are not specified. Only their contribution in the production process is
characterized by the cooperative team production game, and their position in the authority
structure determines their formal authority which can be exercised explicitly or latent. By
extending our model with differences in skills we can require that the implicit exercise of
latent authority is only possible if the subordinate worker is skillful enough to do the work
on its own. Unskilled workers always have to ask for explicit approval.
Garicano [12] develops a similar model in which he uses specialization instead of dif-
ferences in worker skills. In a “knowledge-based hierarchy” easy problems are solved by
lower (production) levels, while more exceptional or harder problems need to be passed on
to higher levels. In his model the decision “who must learn what and whom each worker
should ask when confronted with an unknown problem” is part of the organization. We
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quote from Garicano [12]: “The organization is characterized by the task design, as defined
by the scope of discretionality of production workers and problem solvers and structure of
hierarchy, given by the span of control of problem solvers and the number of layers in the
organization”. Where our model takes the hierarchical organization structure as given and
explains which authority relations are actually activated, Garicano explains the formation
of hierarchies by a trade off between communication versus knowledge acquisition costs.
In our model (like in Beggs [6]) there is no distinction between different knowledge levels
necessary to perform different tasks. A future direction in research is to make this dis-
tinction in our model, and see what is the effect on the exercise of authority. One would
expect that more easy tasks are suitable to be performed under latent authority, while more
difficult tasks need more explicit authority.
Like our model, the above two mentioned papers set aside incentive problems since
(as Beggs argues) to get more insight in the functioning of hierarchical organizations it
is best to focus on one of many aspects. In this sense these models are complementary
to the models which focus on incentive problems such as Qian [31] who endogenously
determines the number of hierarchical levels, the span of control and the wage scales by
using optimal control techniques, and in that way extends the seminal work of Keren and
Levhari [22, 23]. However, these papers do not address the question what authority is
actually exercised within a hierarchy.
Another aspect that we do not address here is the organizational form of a hierarchy.
Maskin, Qian and Xu [26] compare an M-form (multi-divisional form in which the organi-
zation goes along institutional lines) with a U-form (unitary form in which the organization
goes along regional lines) with respect to their effectiveness in giving incentives to man-
agers. In their terminology an organization is a “hierarchy of managers built on top of
technology” where the technology is present in productive plants. It would be interesting
to see if the games that are played within organizations are affected by their organizational
form. For example, we might consider the question whether latent exercise of authority
appears more often in M-form organizations (which each act more independent from each
other in their own region), while in U-form organizations authority is exercised more ex-
plicitly (because the stronger dependence between the different organizational units).
Another strand of literature that we mentioned earlier is the incomplete contracts liter-
ature which tries to answer the question how to distribute ownership over residual rights,
i.e., who has the authority over assets that are non-contractible. While the incomplete con-
tracts literature focusses on the ownership over residual rights to explain the formation of
firms, Rajan and Zingales [32] focus on the control of access to critical resources. In this
respect we follow in our modelling a similar principle. Rajan and Zingales define access as
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“the ability to use, or work with, a critical resource”. We quote: “The agent who is given
privileged access to the resource gets no new residual rights of control. All she gets is
the opportunity to specialize her human capital to the resource and make herself valuable.
When combined with her preexisting residual right to withdraw her human capital, access
gives her the ability to create a critical resource that she controls, her specialized human
capital, control over this resource is a source of power.”
Rajan and Zingales [33] develop this idea further by relating the control of access to
resources to specialization of employees (managers) and try to explain the formation of
(firm) hierarchies.9 This is in line with our model in which we explain the exercise of au-
thority over subordinate employees. Assets are comparable with positions in our authority
structure, and control over assets is exercised by vetoing the access to the productive asset
by agents in subordinate positions. Although their hierarchical structures are much simpler
than ours, also in their model different positions in a hierarchy have different positional
power. Where Rajan and Zingales [33] use positional power to explain the formation of
firm hierarchies (by managers splitting off from a firm and by doing so constructing a new
firm), we use positional power to explain how authority is exercised (i.e. what game is
played) within a given hierarchical production organization.
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Appendix A: Proofs of the main results
Proof of Theorem 2.7
First, we show that the restriction R indeed satisfies the five properties stated in the asser-
tion. Let S ∈ SN and v,w ∈ G N . Since σS(N) = N it holds that R(v,S)(N) = v(σS(N)) =
v(N), and thus R satisfies property (i). R satisfies (ii) since R(v+ w,S)(E) = (v+
w)(σS(E)) = v(σS(E)) +w(σS(E)) = R(v,S)(E) +R(w,S)(E) for all E ⊂ N. If i ∈ N
is such that all j ∈ Ŝ(i)∪{i} are null players in v thenR(v,S)(E) = v(σS(E)) = v(σS(E)\
({i}∪ Ŝ(i))) = v(σS(E \{i})) =R(v,S)(E \{i}) for all E ⊂ N, and thusR satisfies prop-
erty (iii). If i∈N is such that v(E)= 0 for all E ⊂N\{i} and E ⊂N\{i} then i /∈σS(E) and
thusR(v,S)(E)= v(σS(E))= 0, which implies thatR satisfies property (iv). Finally, prop-
erty (v) follows from the fact that j ∈ S(i) and E ⊂N \{i} implies that σS(E) = σS(E \{ j})
and thusR(v,S)(E) = v(σS(E)) = v(σS(E \{ j})) =R(v,S)(E \{ j}).
Next suppose that F : G N × SN → G Nsatisfies the five properties, and let S ∈ SN .
Consider the game wT = cT uT with cT > 0, and uT the unanimity game of T ⊂ N given by
uT (E) =
{
1 if T ⊂ E
0 otherwise.
Property (i) now implies that F (wT ,S)(N) = cT . Define αS(T ) = T ∪ Ŝ−1(T ). We distin-
guish the following cases with respect to E ⊂ N,E 6= N:
• E ⊃ αS(T ). Since for all agents i ∈ N \αS(T ) it holds that all j ∈ Ŝ(i)∪{i} are null
players in wT , property (iii) implies thatF (wT ,S)(E) =F (wT ,S)(N) = cT .
• E + T . Since for all agents i∈ T it holds that wT (E) = 0 for all E ⊂N \{i}, property
(iv) implies thatF (wT ,S)(E) = 0.
• E ⊃ T,E + αS(T ). Then there exist i ∈ αS(T ) \E and j ∈ S(i) ∩T . Properties (iv)
and (v) then imply thatF (wT ,S)(E) =F (wT ,S)(E \{ j}) = 0.
So, F (wT ,S) =R(wT ,S). The theorem then follows with property (ii) and the fact that v
can be expressed as a linear combination of the unanimity games uT in a unique fashion.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.7.
Proof of Theorem 2.8
We proof each of the three assertions stated in the theorem.
(a) Let F ⊂ N be such that h ∈ F . Then for every i ∈ F it holds that Z−1(i) ⊂ F if
and only if T−1(i)⊂ F . From this it follows that σZ(F) = σT (F). Thus, for every
F ⊂ N with h ∈ F we have that
R(v,Z)(F) = v(σZ(F)) = v(σT (F)) =R(v,T )(F). (6)
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Suppose that F ⊂N is such that h /∈ F . Then Z−1(i)⊃ T−1(i) for all i∈ F , and thus
σZ(F) ⊂ σT (F). From the monotonicity of v it then follows that for every F ⊂ N
with h /∈ F it holds that
R(v,Z)(F) = v(σZ(F))6 v(σT (F)) =R(v,T )(F). (7)
These two properties together with dual monotonicity of u establish assertion (a) in
Theorem 2.8.
(b) Together with the properties shown under (a), R (v,Z) 6= R (v,T ) now implies
that there exists some F ⊂ N with h /∈ F for which it holds that R(v,Z)(F) <
R(v,T )(F). Together with (a) and strong dual monotonicity of u this establishes
assertion (b) in Theorem 2.8.
(c) Suppose that v is strictly monotone and that S is acyclic. Furthermore, suppose that
T (h) = ∅ or S is transparent. Then we show that there exists a team F ⊂ N with
h /∈ F for which it holds that R(v,Z)(F)< R(v,T )(F).
We now show that under these conditions S (h) \ T̂ (h) 6= ∅. First, suppose that
T (h) =∅. Then T̂ (h) =∅ and since h ∈ N \WS it then follows that S (h)\ T̂ (h) =
S (h) 6=∅.
Second suppose that S is transparent. Now, we proceed by contradiction and assume
that S (h)\ T̂ (h) =∅. Then S (h)⊂ T̂ (h) and, thus,∅ 6= S (h)\T (h)⊂ T̂ (T (h))⊂
Ŝ (T (h))⊂ Ŝ (S (h)), implying that S (h)∩ Ŝ (S (h)) 6=∅. This contradicts the trans-
parency of S.
Next consider the team
F := T̂−1
(
S (h)\ T̂ (h)
)
∪
[
S (h)\ T̂ (h)
]
. (8)
Remark that S (h)\ T̂ (h) 6= ∅ implies that F 6= ∅. Since S is acyclic, T ∈H(S) is
acyclic as well. This implies that h /∈ F . Furthermore, σT (F) = F ∈ ΦT . Thus,
since v is strictly monotone and F 6=∅, it follows thatR (v,T )(F) = v(F)> 0.
Finally, we note that σZ (F)⊂ F \
[
S (h)\ T̂ (h)
]
since h /∈ F . Hence, since S (h)\
T̂ (h) 6=∅, σZ (F) 6= F , and thus by strict monotonicity of v it holds that
R (v,Z)(F) = v(σZ (F))< v(F) =R (v,T )(F) . (9)
Assertion (c) of Theorem 2.8 now follows with assertions (a) and (b) shown above
and the strong dual monotonicity of the utility structure u in combination with
Lemma 2.2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.8.
Proof of Theorem 3.3
Throughout this proof we let ESi := S (i), i ∈ N, define E S = (ES1 , . . . ,ESn ).
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(a) Let T ∈M(v,S) and consider the corresponding strategy E T . Let i∈N be arbitrary.
Now define
Z ( j) =
{
T ( j) for j 6= i
S (i) for j = i.
By definition of the restriction R and monotonicity of v it now can be concluded
thatR (v,Z) =R (v,S) =R (v,T ). Hence, Z ∈M(v,S).
Now let E :=
(
E T−i,Ei
)
be given, where Ei ⊂ S (i) is arbitrary. From dual mono-
tonicity of u, Theorem 2.8(a), and the definition ofM(v,S) it now follows for agent
i ∈ N that
u0i
(
E
T)= ui (R (v,T )) = ui (R (v,Z))> ui (R (v,TE )) = u0i (E ) .
Hence, since i ∈ N and Ei ⊂ S (i) are arbitrary, E T ∈N (Θ0).
(b) Let E ∈Ns(Θ0) and suppose that E 6= E S. Then there exists some j ∈ N with E j Ã
S ( j). Now consider E := (E− j,S ( j)), then by dual monotonicity and Theorem
2.8(a) we have that u0i
(
E
)
> u0i (E ). This contradicts the strict Nash condition for
E . This implies thatNs(Θ0)⊂
{
E S
}
.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.4
We develop the proof of Theorem 3.4 through a sequence of intermediate results. These
lemmas are put together to form a proof of the assertions stated in the two main theorems.
Throughout this and the next subsection we let (v,S) be a game with an authority structure
such that v is monotone.
Lemma A.1 Let u be a strongly dual monotone utility structure. If T /∈ M (v,S) then
ET /∈ N
(
Θ0
)
.
Proof. If T /∈M(v,S) then there exist j ∈N, h∈ Ŝ−1( j)\ T̂−1( j) and H ⊂N with ∆v(H) 6=
0, H ∩ T̂ (h) =∅ and H ∩ T̂ ( j) 6=∅. (If such a j,h and H would not exist then R (v,T ) =
R (v,S) and thus T ∈M(v,S).) But then there exists a sequence of agents h1, . . . ,hp such
that h1 = j, hp = h, hk ∈ S(hk+1) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1}, and j /∈ T̂ (hk) for at least one
k ∈ {2, . . . , p}. Let m ∈ {2, . . . , p} be the lowest label for which j /∈ T̂ (hm) and there exists
H ⊂ N with ∆v(H) 6= 0,H ∩ T̂ (hm) = ∅ and H ∩ T̂ ( j) 6= ∅. (Note that such a label exists
because it holds for label p.) Then, for Z ∈H(S) given by
Z (i) =
{
T (i) for i 6= hm
T (hm)∪{hm−1} for i = hm,
it holds that R (v,Z) 6= R(v,T ). Since R (v,Z)(E) 6 R(v,T )(E) for all E ⊂ N, and
R (v,Z)(E) =R(v,T )(E) for all E ⊂ N with hm ∈ E, it follows from strong dual mono-
tonicity of u that E T /∈N
(
Θ0
)
. ¤
The next lemma discusses situations in which the full authority structure S is (v,S)-minimal.
Lemma A.2 Let u be a strongly dual monotonic utility structure and let S ∈ M̂(v,S). Then
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(a) E S ∈Ns(Θ0), and
(b) N (Θ0) = {E S}.
Proof. Under the assumptions, by definition, M̂(v,S) =M(v,S) = {S}.
(a) Let i∈N be arbitrary and let E := (E S−i,Ei), where EiÃ S (i) is arbitrary as well. The
resulting authority structure is given by TE /∈M(v,S). Hence, R (v,TE ) 6=R (v,S).
From strong dual monotonicity of u and Theorem 2.8(b) it now follows that
u0i
(
E
S
)
= ui (R (v,S))> ui (R (v,TE )) = u0i (E ) .
Hence, E S ∈Ns(Θ0).
(b) This assertion follows from Lemma 6 and the fact that S ∈ M̂(v,S) implies that
T /∈M(v,S) for all T ∈H(S) with T 6= S.
This shows Lemma A.2. ¤
Now Theorem 3.4(a) follows immediately from Proposition 3.3(b) and Lemma A.2. Next
we turn to the proof of assertion 3.4(b).
Proof of Theorem 3.4(b). Now the assertion that N (Θ0) = {E T |T ∈M(v,S)} is a
simple consequence of the properties given in Proposition 3.3(a) and Lemma A.1.
It remains to be shown that Ns(Θ0) = ∅. From Proposition 3.3(b) it only remains to
be shown that E S is not a strict Nash equilibrium. Namely, by assumption there exists
some T ∈M(v,S) with T 6= S. Then it follows that there is some j ∈ N with T ( j)Ã S ( j).
Consider the authority structure Z given by
Z (i) =
{
S (i) if i 6= j
T ( j) if i = j.
From a repeated application of Theorem 2.8(a) it can be concluded thatR (v,Z) =R (v,S),
i.e., Z ∈M(v,S). Now it can immediately be concluded that E S cannot be a strict Nash
equilibrium of the authority game Θ0. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3.5
Lemma A.3 Let u be a strongly monotone utility structure. For every (v,S)-minimal au-
thority structure T ∈ M̂(v,S) there exists a cost level cT > 0 such that ET ∈ N (Θc) for
every 06 c6 cT .
Proof. Let T ∈ M̂(v,S) be (v,S)-minimal. Then by Theorem 2.8(a) and (b) we have for
every i ∈ N that
u0i
(
E
S
)
= u0i
(
E
T)= u0i (E T− j,S ( j)) .
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for any agent j ∈ N. Now define for j ∈ N \WS
δ j = min
{
u0j
(
E
T
− j,S ( j)
)
−u0j
(
E
T
− j,E j
) ∣∣∣∣∣ E j ⊂ S ( j) such thatR (v,S) 6=R(v,T(E T− j,E j))
}
We remark that if ETj 6=∅, δ j > 0 due to the fact that T ∈ M̂(v,S). Finally we introduce
cT := min
{ δ j
|T ( j)|+1
∣∣∣∣ j ∈ N \WS with δ j > 0}> 0. (10)
Let i ∈ N \WS and let E =
(
E T−i,Ei
)
with Ei ⊂ S (i). Now we consider two cases:
Case A R (v,T ) =R (v,TE )
Then by definition of (v,S)-minimality of T it follows that |T (i)| 6 |Ei|. Hence for
any c > 0 we conclude that
uci
(
E
T)−uci (E ) = u0i (E T)−u0i (E )+ c(|Ei|− |T (i)|)
= c(|Ei|− |T (i)|)> 0.
Case B R (v,T ) 6=R (v,TE )
Then by strong dual monotonicity of u and Theorem 2.8(b) we conclude that u0i
(
E T
)
=
u0i
(
E T−i,S (i)
)
> u0i (E ). Hence, δi > 0. Let 0 < c < cT . Now we derive by definition
of cT that
uci
(
E
T)−uci (E ) = u0i (E T)−u0i (E )+ c(|Ei|− |T (i)|)
> δi− cT |T (i)|> 0.
Cases A and B now complete the proof of the assertion stated in Lemma A.3. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Consider any E ∈ Γ such that TE /∈ M̂(v,S). We now distinguish
two possible cases:
Case A: TE /∈M(v,S)
Then by Theorem 3.4 E /∈ N
(
Θ0
)
. Hence, there exists some jE ∈ N \WS with
u0jE (E )< u
0
jE (E
′), where E ′ =
(
E− jE ,S ( jE )
)
. Define
cE =
1
|S ( jE )|
(
u0jE
(
E
′
)
−u0jE (E )
)
> 0.
Then for any 06 c < cE we have that
ucjE
(
E
′
)
−ucjE (E ) = u
0
jE
(
E
′
)
−u0jE (E )+ c
(∣∣E jE ∣∣−|S ( jE )|)
> (cE − c) |S ( jE )|> 0.
Thus, E /∈N (Θc).
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Case B: TE ∈M(v,S)
By Theorem 3.4(b) we know that E ∈N (Θ0). Since TE /∈ M̂(v,S), we conclude
from the definition of the restriction R that there exists some T̂ ∈ M̂(v,S) with∣∣∣T̂ (i)∣∣∣6 |TE (i)| for all i ∈ N and ∣∣∣T̂ ( j)∣∣∣< |TE ( j)| for some j ∈ N \WS. Also from
Theorem 3.4(b) we conclude that E T̂ ∈N (Θ0). Thus, for any c > 0 we conclude
that
ucj
(
E
T̂
)
−ucj (E ) = u
0
j
(
E
T̂
)
−u0j (E )+ c
(
|TE ( j)|−
∣∣∣T̂ ( j)∣∣∣)
= c
(
|TE ( j)|−
∣∣∣T̂ ( j)∣∣∣)> 0.
Hence, E /∈N (Θc).
Now define using the constructions in Lemma A.3 and Case A
c∗ = min
{
cT
∣∣∣T ∈ M̂(v,S)}∪{cE |E ∈ Γ with TE /∈M(v,S)}> 0.
Now for any 0 < c < c∗ it follows that
(i) from Lemma A.3:
{
E T
∣∣∣T ∈ M̂(v,S)}⊂N (Θc), and
(ii) from Case A and Case B:N (Θc)⊂
{
E T
∣∣∣T ∈ M̂(v,S)}.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.5. ¤
Proof of Theorem 4.2
The proof of Theorem 4.2 is based on results from the theory of social situations, developed
in Greenberg [15]. Greenberg develops the notion of a stable standard of behavior as the
main equilibrium concept within this theory. In this proof we transform our notion of a
stable authority protocol into a stable standard of behavior of an appropriately constructed
social situation. The proof of the existence of the SAP then becomes a straightforward
application of the main existence theorem developed by Greenberg.
Let (u,v,S) and c > 0 be as in Theorem 4.2. Hence, v ∈ G N is a monotone game
and S ∈ S N is an acyclic authority structure. Furthermore, (u,v,S) does not have any
inessential agents. We now construct a social situation from (u,v,S). (For an exhaustive
discussion and definition of a social situation we refer to Chapter 2 in Greenberg [15], in
particular Definitions 2.1.1 and 2.1.3.)
First, for every T ∈H(S) we define
XT =
{
R (v,Z) ∈ G N
∣∣Z ∈H(S) and Z (i) = T (i) for all i ∈ ψ ′ (T )} ,
for every i ∈ N the restricted utility function f Ti : XT → R is for every w ∈ XT given by
f Ti (w) = ui (w)− c |T (i)|, and for every E ⊂ N and w ∈ XT we define
γT (E,w) =
{
γi (T ) if E = {i}
∅ otherwise
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where γi is the veto correspondence for agent i ∈ N.
We remark that these definitions imply that every agent can announce to enforce her
authority at most once. Now the tuple ϒc =
(
H(S) ,
(
XT , f T ,γT)T∈H(S)) defines a social
situation introduced by Greenberg [15]. We now develop the proof of Theorem 4.2 through
a series of intermediate results.
From the definition of an Optimistically Stable Standard of Behavior10 (OSSB) and a
stable authority protocol the next lemma follows trivially. A proof is therefore omitted.
Lemma A.4 Any OSSB of the social situation ϒc corresponds to an SAP for (u,v,S).
Furthermore, any SAP for (u,v,S) corresponds to an OSSB of social situation ϒc.
The set of positions in ϒc corresponds to the set of authority structures H(S) in the author-
ity situation. For the next lemma we remark that the notions of hierarchical and strictly
hierarchical social situations are given in Definitions 5.1.1 and 5.3.2 in Greenberg [15].
Lemma A.5 The social situation ϒc is strictly hierarchical.
Proof. Let n0 := |N \WS| and let for every k ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n0}
Pk := {T ∈H(S) | |ψ (T )|= n0− k} .
Clearly, P0 = {S0} and Pn0 = {T ∈H(S) |T (i) 6=∅ for i ∈ N \WS}. Now, the collection
{P0, . . . ,Pn0} forms a partition ofH(S). Also, from above γT (E,w) =∅ for all E ⊂ N and
w ∈ XT if T ∈ Pn0 .
Let k ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n0−1} and take T ∈ Pk. Then for every i ∈ ψ (T ) and w ∈ XT obvi-
ously γT ({i} ,w) ⊂ Pk+1, since |ψ (T ′)| = |ψ (T )|− 1 for T ′ ∈ γT ({i} ,w). Furthermore,
γT (E,w) =∅ for all E ⊂ N such that there is no i ∈ ψ (T ) with E = {i}. So, we conclude
that ((
n0⋃
t=k+1
Pt
)
∪{T},
(
XH ,uH ,γH
)
H∈(
⋃n0
t=k+1 Pt)∪{T}
)
is indeed a social situation. Hence, we conclude that ϒ satisfies requirement H.1 of Defini-
tion 5.1.1 in Greenberg [15], pages 43–44. Furthermore, requirement H.2 of that definition
is satisfied as well by ϒc. So, ϒc is indeed hierarchical.
Finally we observe that there is no E ⊂ N and w ∈ XT for which T ∈ γT (E,w). Hence, ϒc
satisfies Definition 5.3.2 in Greenberg [15], page 52. ¤
The next lemma follows immediately from Lemma A.5 and Corollary 5.3.3 in Greenberg
[15], page 52. A proof is therefore omitted.
Lemma A.6 The social situation ϒc admits a unique OSSB σ c∗ :H(S)→ 2X
T
.
Assertion (a) of Theorem 4.2 now follows immediately from Lemmas A.4 and A.6. To
show assertion (b) as well, we define for T ∈ H(S) and h ∈ ψ(T ) the authority structure
Th ∈H(S) by
10For the definition of an Optimistically Stable Standard of Behavior, or OSSB, we again refer to Green-
berg, Section 2.3 and Definitions 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.3.
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Th (i) =
{
T (i) if i ∈ N \{h}
S (i) if i = h,
and pi(T ) = {h ∈ ψ(T ) |uh(R (v,Th))−uh(R (v,T ))> 0}.
Lemma A.7 Let the utility structure u be strongly dual monotone, let there be at least one
agent i ∈ N with S(i) 6= ∅, and let c := minT∈H(S),h∈pi(T ){uh(R (v,Th))− uh(R (v,T ))}.
For c∗ := c
maxi∈N |S(i)| it then follows that
1. c∗ > 0, and
2. c∗ = 0 if and only if R (v,T ) =R (v,S) for.all T ∈H(S) .
Proof. From the definition of c∗ the fact that u satisfies strong dual monotonicity, and
Theorem 2.8(a) it immediately follows that c∗ > 0.
It is also easy to see that c∗ = c = 0 ifR (v,T ) =R (v,S) for all T ∈H(S) .
Now suppose that R (v,T ) 6=R (v,S) for some T ∈ H(S) . Then there exists a T ∈ H(S)
and h ∈ ψ(T ) such that R (v,Th) 6=R (v,T ). Since u satisfies strong dual monotonicity it
follows from Theorem 2.8(b) that uh(R (v,Th))− uh(R (v,T )) > 0. But then c > 0, and
thus c∗ > 0. ¤
Our final step in the proof of assertion (b) in Theorem 4.2 is the following:
Lemma A.8 Let the utility structure u be strongly dual monotone and let the monitoring
cost satisfy c < c∗, where c∗ is as defined in Lemma A.7. Then for every T ∈ H(S) the
unique OSSB σ c∗ of the social situation ϒc is given by σ c∗ (T )≡ {R (v,Z)} where Z ∈ SN
is given by
Z (i) =
{
T (i) if i /∈ ψ (T )
S (i) if i ∈ ψ (T ) .
Proof. The proof consists of two steps, constituting a proof by induction on the partition
discussed in the proof of Lemma A.5.
First, let T ∈ Pn0 . Using the notion of the Optimistic Dominion given in Greenberg [15],
page 19, and Greenberg [15] Definition 2.4.7 plus the fact that γT (E,w) =∅ for all E ⊂ N
and w ∈ XT , we compute the unique OSSB for ϒc to be given by
σ c∗ (T ) = X
T = {R (v,Z) |Z ∈H(S) and Z (i) = T (i) , i ∈ N } .
We note that ψ (T ) =∅. Thus,
σ c∗ (T ) =
{
R (v,Z)
∣∣∣∣ Z (i) = T (i) for i /∈ ψ (T )Z (i) = S (i) for i ∈ ψ (T )
}
Second, suppose that for all T ∈ Pt with t ∈ {k, . . . ,n0}, where k > 1, it holds that
σ c∗ (T ) =
{
R (v,Z)
∣∣∣∣ Z (i) = T (i) for i /∈ ψ (T )Z (i) = S (i) for i ∈ ψ (T )
}
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Let T ∈ Pk−1. Choose h ∈ ψ (T ) and let Z ∈H(S) be given by
Z (i) =
{
S (i) if i = h
T (i) otherwise.
Note that T (h) = ∅. Since, u is strongly dual monotone, it follows by definition of c∗
that uh (R (v,Z))−uh (R (v,T ))> c|S(h)| > c
∗ ifR (v,Z) 6=R (v,T ). SinceR (v,Z) ∈ XT ∩
γT ({h} ,R (v,T )) and c < c∗ it can be concluded that R (v,T ) /∈ σ c∗ (T ) if R (v,Z) 6=
R (v,T ). Thus,
σ c∗ (T )⊂
{
R (v,Z)
∣∣∣∣ Z (i) = T (i) for i /∈ ψ (T )Z (i) = S (i) for i ∈ ψ (T )
}
From Theorem 2.8(b) it also follows that this inclusion can be reversed as well. This shows
the assertion. ¤
To complete the proof of Theorem 4.2 we remark that from Lemma A.8 it can immediately
be concluded that for 06 c < c∗ it holds that
Σc∗ (S0) = σ c∗ (S0) = {R (v,Z) |Z (i) = S (i) for i ∈ N }= {R (v,S)} .
Hence, we have established assertion (b) of Theorem 4.2. Since we already established
assertion (a), we have completed the proof of Theorem 4.2.
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Appendix B: Regarding dual monotonicity
From the analysis in this paper we conclude that the dual monotonicity condition on the
utility structure is of great significance. For both explicit as well as latent exercise of
authority, the dual monotonicity and strong dual monotonicity properties introduced in
Definition 2.1 are identified as the main hypotheses under which complete control of access
to the productive asset is established. In this appendix we investigate the (strong) dual
monotonicity properties and compare them to some more familiar monotonicity concepts
from the literature. Our main insight is that the dual monotonicity concept is not stronger
than the monotonicity concepts used in the literature.
First, we compare our dual monotonicity concepts with the notion of strong mono-
tonicity discussed in Young [43]. A utility structure u : G N → RN satisfies Young’s strong
monotonicity property if for every v,w∈ G N and i ∈ N it holds that ui(v)> ui(w) whenever
v(E ∪{i})− v(E)> w(E ∪{i})−w(E) for all E ⊂ N \{i}.
Proposition B.1 If u : GN → RN satisfies Young’s strong monotonicity property, then it
satisfies dual monotonicity.
Proof. Suppose that u : G N → RN satisfies Young’s strong monotonicity and let v,w ∈ G N
satisfy the condition stated in Definition 2.1.3, i.e., for some F ⊂ N it holds that v(F) 6
w(F) and for all other teams E ∈ 2N \{F} it holds that v(E) = w(E). For every i ∈ N \F
it then holds that v(F ∪{i})− v(F) > w(F ∪{i})−w(F) and v(E ∪{i})− v(E) = w(E ∪
{i})−w(E) for all E ∈ 2N \{F}.
From Young’s strong monotonicity of u it then follows that ui(v)> ui(w). Thus, u satisfies
dual monotonicity. ¤
Dual monotonicity does not imply Young’s strong monotonicity property as the following
example shows.
Example B.2 Let u : G N →RN be the egalitarian utility structure given by ui(v) = v(N)n for
all i ∈ N. Obviously the utility structure u is dual monotone.
Consider the games v,w ∈ G N with N = {1,2,3} given by v(E) = |E| for all E ⊂ N, and
w(E) = 1 if 1∈ E, and w(E) = 0 otherwise. Then v(E∪{1})−v(E) =w(E∪{1})−w(E)
for all E ⊂ N \{1}. But u1(v) = 1 > 13 = u1(w). This shows that u indeed does not satisfy
Young’s strong monotonicity property. ¤
A utility structure u : G N → RN satisfies coalitional monotonicity if for every v,w ∈ G N
such that there is an F ⊂ N for which v(F)> w(F), and v(E) = w(E) for all E ∈ 2N \{F},
it holds that ui(v) > ui(w) for all i ∈ F . Coalitional monotonicity has been considered by
Shubik [38] and in some sense can be perceived as a dual formulation of dual monotonicity.
The following example shows that in general these two properties do not imply one another.
Example B.3 Let gi(v) = max{maxE3i v(E),0} for all i ∈ N and v ∈ G N , and let G(v) =
∑i∈N gi(v)> 0.
Let the utility structure u : G N → R distribute the worth v(N) proportional to the values
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gi(v) over the agents if G(v)> 0, and according to the egalitarian rule that is considered in
Example B.2 if G(v) = 0, i.e.,
ui(v) =
{
gi(v)
G(v) v(N) if G(v)> 0
v(N)
n
if G(v) = 0.
This utility structure satisfies dual monotonicity but does not satisfy coalitional monotonic-
ity. Consider the games v,w ∈ G N with N = {1,2,3} given by
v(E) =
{
1 if E ∈ {{1},{1,2}}
0 otherwise, and w(E) =
{
1 if E = {1}
0 otherwise.
Then v({1,2}) > w({1,2}) and v(E) = w(E) for all E ∈ 2N \ {{1,2}}. But u1(v) = 12 <
1 = u1(w).
Similarly, by taking gi(v) =max{minE, i∈E v(E),0} it can be shown that coalitional mono-
tonicity does not imply dual monotonicity. ¤
It turns out that dual and coalitional monotonicity are equivalent under the assumption that
the utility structure satisfies additivity and the null player property.
Proposition B.4 Let the utility structure u : GN → RN satisfy additivity and the null player
property. Then u satisfies dual monotonicity if and only if it satisfies coalitional mono-
tonicity.
Proof. Let u : G N → RN satisfy additivity and the null player property. According to The-
orem 3 in Weber [40] it then holds that for every i ∈ N there exists a collection of constants
piE , E ⊂ N \{i}, such that (i) ∑E⊂N\{i} piE = 1, and (ii) ui(v) =∑E⊂N\{i} piE(v(E∪{i})−
v(E)) for every v ∈ G N .
We now show that u satisfies dual monotonicity if and only if piE > 0 for all i ∈ N and
E ⊂ N \{i}.
Only if
Suppose that u satisfies dual monotonicity. Let i ∈ N, F ⊂ N \{i}, and let v ∈ G N be such
that v(F)6 v0(F) and v(E) = v0(E) for all E ∈ 2N \{F}, where v0 denotes the null game,
i.e., v0(E) = 0 for all E ⊂ N.
From Weber’s result it follows that ui(v) = piF(v(F ∪ {i})− v(F)). According to dual
monotonicity and the null player property it holds that ui(v) > ui(v0) = 0. Since v(F ∪
{i})− v(F)> 0 it must hold that piF > 0.
If
Suppose that piE > 0 for all i ∈ N and E ⊂ N \ {i}. Let v,w ∈ G N satisfy the condition
stated in Definition 2.1.3 for team F ⊂ N, and let i ∈ N \F . Further, let w′ ∈ G N be given
by w′(E) = w(E)− v(E) for all E ⊂ N.
Since piF ≥ 0, w′(F ∪ {i}) = 0, and w′(F) > 0 it holds that ui(w′) = piF(w′(F ∪ {i})−
w′(F))6 0.
Since u satisfies additivity and w= v+w′ it holds that ui(w) = ui(v)+ui(w′)6 ui(v). Thus,
u satisfies dual monotonicity.
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In a similar fashion it can be shown that u satisfies coalitional monotonicity if and only if
piE > 0 for all i ∈ N and E ⊂ N \ {i}. Combining these two equivalence properties yields
that u satisfies dual monotonicity if and only if it satisfies coalitional monotonicity. ¤
In the previous sections we also used strong dual monotonicity in our analysis. A utility
structure u : G N → RN satisfies this property if it satisfies the dual monotonicity condition
stated with the inequalities replaced by strict inequalities. (This is stated in Definition 2.1
(iv).) Similarly we can replace the inequalities in the definitions of strong and coalitional
monotonicity by strict inequalities. Propositions B.1 and B.4 also hold if we replace the
monotonicity concepts by these strict monotonicity concepts.
It is easy to see that, for example, all utility structures u : G N →RN for which there are
constants pk > 0, 06 k6 n, such that for every v∈G N it holds that ui(v)=∑E⊂N p|E|(v(E∪
{i})− v(E)), satisfy strong dual monotonicity as well as strong coalitional monotonic-
ity. Familiar examples of such solution concepts are the Shapley value, for which pk =
(k−1)!(n−k)!
n! , and the Banzhaf value, for which pk =
1
2n−1 , for all 1 6 k 6 n. (For an elabo-
rate discussion of this class of utility structures we also refer to Weber [40].)
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